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Abstract
Hybrid Multi-Agent Architectures support mobile robots
colonies moving in dynamic, unpredictable and time vary-
ing environments to achieve collective team-oriented behav-
iors for solving complicate and difficult tasks. The develop-
ment of a new coalition formation and coordination frame-
work for robot colonies in dangerous, unknown and dynamic
environment is outlined. The name of this new framework
is Metaphor of Politics (MP), and it loosely takes inspiration
from the political organizations of democratic governments.
The main characteristic of the proposed framework lies in its
dynamic reconfigurability in order to adapt the robot colony
to environmental changes.
Introduction
The problem for the coalition formation and coordination
of a robots team for complex tasks in dynamic, not pre-
dictable environments has been studied in the robotic liter-
ature by many researchers (Arkin and Balch, 1998) (Balch
and Parker, 2002) (Gerkey and Mataric, 2002) (Fredslund
and Mataric, 2002) (Mataric, 1995) (Murphy et al., 2002)
(Parker , 1998). In this paper a new hybrid and dynamic
framework is proposed. This framework takes inspiration
from the political organizations of the democratic govern-
ments. The main idea behind the framework is that the lead-
ership is not owned by a single robot, but by a government
of robots. The “robot citizens” then execute the tasks ac-
cording to the government rules. In this way a compromise
may be reached among the centralized and the distributed
approaches. The goal of the framework is to have a dis-
tribution of the planning actions, where each robot saves a
deliberative independence status without losing its own reac-
tivity. The agents receive high level goals by the government
members and exploits their own deliberative capabilities to
choose the faster strategy. The idea is to coordinate a colony
of robots that are able to exhibit complex behaviors in order
to accomplish a high-level mission but at the same time the
framework includes a mechanism to form a new coalition
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caused by a failure of the government’s strategy or a general
inefficiency of the whole colony during the reaching of the
mission’s goals.
Mathematical Model
The MP framework considers a colony composed ofH
robots andM political parties, withM ≤ H to guarantee
the presence of at least one robot for every party. Within
this framework a set of political issues is associated with
every robot, which may express, for example, the individ-
ual’s attitude towards risk, its dependence on reactive or
deliberative behavior, its exploration proclivities, or interest
in object recovery. The robots’ attitudes towards these
issues are represented over the range [-1,1], where 0 means
don’t care, -1 absolutely not, and 1 absolutely yes. Each
party is represented by an ideal prototypical robot, standing
for the central positions with respect to the political issues
that characterize the party. Each robot is identified byN
features; for each roboti and partyj there is a vector ofn
issues:IRi ,I
P
j ∈ M (n×1) wherei = 1 . . .H, j = 1 . . .M ,
P = party andR = robot. As an example to describe our
model, we consider 3 issues which are identified with the
following terms and meanings:
– WELFARE: Energy of the robot
– DEFENSE: Attitude towards risk
– LABOR: Amount of work
Every issue is weighted by a non-negative coefficient (from
0 to +∞), where the coefficient represents the intensity or
the strength of the issue. Every robotRi and partyPj is
represented by a vector withn components:
Ri = SRi · IRi , Pj = SPj · IPj (1)
whereSRi , S
P
j are diagonaln × n matrixes containing the
weights of the robots’ attitudes towards the issues and of the
parties issues respectively;Ri andPj are representative of
a robot and of a party in a multi-dimensional space called
ROBOT ISSUES SPACE.
There exist several designated political roles within the
coalition that a robot can occupy when elected. The het-
erogeneity of the robots inside the colony is described by a
Roles Matrix (RM ) which shows the capability for a robot
to qualify for a role in the government; in the case of having
H robots and 4 roles the matrix will be of rankH × 4.
Voting Process
The voting process consists of two steps. The first step is
Cluster Identification, where classical clustering techniques
can be applied to our problem for the identification of the
membership’s groups. The literature provides several can-
didates; in particular we focus onVoronoi tessellation. In
the MP framework, the cluster identification step groups the
robots of the colony on the basis of their party membership;
this choice is based on the consideration that every robot
maintains a political orientation depending on the closest
aligned political party according to the issues. A robotRi
is deemed to belong to thePj party if the following condi-
tion holds:
Ri ∈ Pj ⇔ di,j = min
k
{di,k} k = 1, 2, . . . M (2)
wheredi,k is the euclidean distance between the robotRi
and the idealized party positionPk in the ROBOT ISSUES
SPACE(figure 1 shows the result of the clustering process).
The second step isVote Extraction: the vote expressed by
Figure 1: Clustering formation
a robot is simulated by a random number generated in the
interval [0,1]. This interval is divided intoM sub-intervals,
each associated to one of theM parties. The robot’s gen-
erated value forms is considered as the vote expression a
particular party. For every roboti of the colony, the size of
each party’s subdivision of the interval [0,1] is based on the





% k = 1, 2, . . . M ; (3)
To obtain
∑
dRELi,j = 100% for each roboti, we normalize
by a value equal to1/(M − 1).
Coalition Formation
The formation of a political coalition which constitutes the
new government is made with the support of a linear space,
the POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SPACE. This space represents
all the robots and the parties belonging to theROBOT IS-
SUES SPACE. The mapping between these two spaces is per-
formed by a mapping functionf(·) operating between the
two representation spaces that groups robots exhibiting sim-
ilar voting tendencies as evidenced during the voting pro-
cess. The mapping is based on the following considerations:
analogous to an actual parliament, the coalition axis is di-
vided into 3 sections, each representing the ideologies of the
left, center and right political viewpoints. The origin point
of this linear space is centered to coincide with the pure po-
litical center, resulting in negative values being associated
with parties aligned to the left and positive values to those
towards the right. Two functions,fR(·) andfL(·), are in-
troduced in order to determine, when applied to aPj party,
those aspects which respectively characterize trends to the
left or right. Each evaluated party will have an overall po-
litical trend determined as a compromise between its con-
stituent right and left views on the issues. We represent the
overall position of the partyPj with pj in the coalition (ide-
ology) space using the following heuristic equation:
pj = f(Pj) = fR(Pj)− fL(Pj) . (4)
According to the previous equation, a positive value identi-
fies a rightist party while a negative one identifies a leftist
one; values closer to zero identify right-center or left-center
parties. The functions are based on suitable vectors of co-
efficients which weigh the members of the party. The co-
efficient values are related to the opinions associated with
the issues of the parties in order to identify their ideology
in the ROBOT ISSUES SPACE. For a linearf , the functional
mapping is:
pj = MTR · Pj −MTL · Pj = (MR −ML)T · Pj (5)
whereMR,ML ∈ M (n×1). A political massmi,j is asso-
ciated with each roboti and represents its weight within the






if i voted forj, 0 otherwise (6)
where the indexk includes all the robots of the colony which
expressed a vote for thej party. Every party represented
in the POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SPACE is characterized by a
mass center dependent on the robots which expressed a vote
for the party, and the political masses associated with the
robots themselves. This center of mass is obtained using an





i mi,j · ri∑
i mi,j
(7)
where the indexi describes all the robots of the colony
which votedj. Figure 2 shows a graphic representation of
this situation.
When the mapping process is finished, the coalition which
will constitute the new government is formed by adding ad-
jacent parties to the winning party until more than 50% of
the total votes cast are reached. The concept of adjacent
party is related to the distance between the center of mass of
the winning party and the center of mass of the remaining
ones. This coalition formation is represented in figure 2 for
a case involving 3 parties and 11 robots.
Figure 2: Mass center and coalitions
Role Determination
In our simulation, we choose the following government
roles: Prime Minister (PM), Minister of Defence(MD),
Minister of Communications(MC), assigned on the basis of
the following rules: the PM is chosen from the robots be-
longing to the winningparty, while the MD and the MC are
chosen between the robots belonging to the winningcoali-
tion which have not assumed a previous governative role.





the positions of the robots which satisfy these conditions,
and withrCM the position of the center of mass of the win-
ning party, the PM role is assigned to the roboti closer to the
rCM center of mass, the MD role is assigned to the roboti
positioned to the rightmost extremity of the coalition, and
the MC role is assigned to the robotj positioned to the left-
most extremity of the coalition:
Ri = PM ⇔ r(PM)i = min
k
|r(PM)k − rCM | (8)
Ri = MD ⇔ r(MD)i = max
k
(r(MD)k − rCM ) (9)
Rj = MC ⇔ r(MC)j = min
k
(r(MC)k − rCM ) (10)
A graphic representation of the roles assignment appears in
figure 3 and in figure 4.
Conducting Business
The robots comprising the new government produce behav-
ior to achieve their common goals in agreement with the
underlying political ideologies of the their coalition. The
political ideologies are represented by astrategy that the
robots must adopt. In the MP framework, two fundamen-
tal strategies are used: a leftist progressive (typically reac-
tive) and a right-wing conservative (typically deliberative).
In general, the government coalition is constituted by sev-
eral parties for which these two strategies are the extremes
of an overall methodology which changes its characteristics
Figure 3: Determine roles in thePOLITICAL IDEOLOGY
SPACE
Figure 4: Determine roles in theROBOT ISSUES SPACE
depending of the formation of the government. A right-
center or left-center government will favor either a progres-
sive or conservative strategy based on the weight given to
the right or the left components during the formation of
the government coalition. A strategy is characterized by
a set of parameters which identify various aspects of the
robot’s behavior; each parameter has values along a contin-
uous interval whose extremes (lower and upper) are associ-
ated with the left and right strategies. For every parameter
s, for each ofM parties there is an associated value so that
s1 ≤ s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sj ≤ . . . ≤ sM wherej represents the
generic party ands1, sM identifies the two extreme parties.
The winning coalition is constituted fromM ′ parties with
M ′ ≤ M . The parametersc is only affected by the parties
that form the coalition, where acts on the basis of its relative
weight within in the coalition. Its value is calculated as a




ak · sk (11)
wherek refers to the parties which form the coalition. The
ak weight associated with thek-th party is obtained by tak-
ing into account theVk votes which it received with respect





Mini-Crisis . A mini-crisis is a mechanism which allows the
partial replacement of the government with new robots be-
longing to the existing coalition and business is conducted
using the same strategy. This mechanism eliminates the
need for re-election of a new government and works to solve
inefficiencies like the death, damage, or excessive loss of
energy of any current government members, which would
negatively affect the behavior of the entire colony. A robot
fault/failure requires a change in the Roles Matrix; for in-
stance if the elected roboti- h cannot cover its rolek-th any
longer, then the matrix element(k, i) is replaced with a zero
value. A mini-crisis is generated when an operating param-
eter exceeds its limits as well, for instance when the Welfare
(which could provide information about the robots’ avail-
able energy), falls below a critical threshold. A mini-crisis
is not as critical as a full re-election that would stress the
existing coalition, rejecting the current strategy being used,
even if the overall colony behavior was acceptable.
Re-election. The re-election mechanism allows the colony
to either reconfirm the previous coalition or change it com-
pletely. A re-election is normally caused by the expiration
of a fixed time assigned for the government to complete the
entire mission (TIME OUT), or in exceptional circumstances
for evident deficiencies in the performance of the colony
(NO CONFIDENCE), that is not imputable to a single robot
but rather to the governing strategy. For instance if mini-
crises occur frequently then there is something wrong in the
adopted policy and a re-election needs to be conducted.
Experimental Results
Unlike robotic architectures which employ complex central
management of a simple-robot colony, the MP framework
focuses on coordination of robots which each possess a
high degree of autonomy. Every robot is able to express a
vote to elect a party, in order to form a political coalition
and to identify a governing strategy that permits the accom-
plishment of mission goals. The MP framework has been
implemented using theMissionLabsimulation environment
developed at the Georgia Institute of Technology, including




The interaction among the states of the framework is shown
in figure 5. The core of the implemented framework is the
ELECTION state which represents a macro-state containing
the two following sub-states:
a) VOTING PROCESS
b) COALITION FORMATION
which are responsible respectively for the voting mechanism
for all robots and the formation of the political coalitions
which constitute new governments. TheVOTING PROCESS
Figure 5: The Robot State Automata Diagram
is constructed with a set of parameters that characterize each
robot; these parameters change during the mission’s execu-
tion relative for to the quality of assigned task execution.
Each robot can be assigned a specific low-level task if the
robot’s role is as a citizen (e.g., exploration, bomb defusing)
or a high-level task if the robot is a government member
(planning, communication). TheCOALITION FORMATION
phase determines the winning party on the basis of the votes
expressed by the single robots. In order to constitute a win-
ning coalition, parties are selected that are closely aligned to
the winning one. TheELECTION state determines the win-
ning political coalition which will constitute the new gov-
ernment. Once the elections have completed and the coali-
tion has been formed, theDETERMINING ROLES state de-
termines which robots will cover the governmental roles.
Specifically PM, MD and MC are chosen in order to span
the entire coalition ideology, thus guaranteeing the govern-
ment’s future strength. TheCONDUCTING BUSINESSstate
allows a winning government to complete the various tasks
assigned it, following a strategy which reflects the political
trend of the coalition. The government’s strategy is a com-
promise between the strategies of the single parties which
compose the coalition. In the finite state automata (FSA)
shown in figure 5, the triggers (links) produce the transi-
tions between various states during mission execution. Their
meaning is as follows:
1. COALITION FORMED: Initiates robot role determination
when election and coalition formation processes are con-
cluded.
2. ROLES ASSIGNED: Carries out the strategy embodied by
the political trend of the government, occurring when the
role assignment phase has finished.
3. MINI CRISIS: Makes a new assignment of government
roles, while keeping the political trend of the government
unchanged.
4. NO CONFIDENCE: Undertakes a new election as a result
of general inefficiency in the whole robot colony.
5. TIME OUT: Generates a new election process when the
expiration of time assigned to the government to complete
the whole mission occurs.
Figure 5 depicts the MP framework design for use in an
unstructured, dynamic, and time-varying environment with
unknown or moving obstacles. This domain represents po-
tential use in an application such as mine-defusing by a
robotic colony with the presence of high risk for damage
to the robots. In order to show MP performances, we cre-
ated two alternative architectures, named Dictatorship and
Anarchy. These alternatives had a twofold purpose: they are
at the same time opponents and part of the MP framework.
We used in fact them either individually to evaluate their
own performance, or inside the MP architecture. In other
words, we considered them the two extreme strategies (left
and right) between whom our model can dynamically chose,
as stated earlier.
Opponent Architectures
These other approaches are distinguished from MP because
of the total absence of elections, and thus the impossibility of
changing their work in accordance with external conditions
and previous results. They are now described in detail:
1. Anarchy: This architecture is characterized by the ex-
treme uncertainty of its work. In fact, the robots belong-
ing to the colony explore the area without any fixed strat-
egy, until one of them finds a bomb. When it happens, the
robot who found it, calls the nearest one to complete the
requested operation. When this activity is completed (ei-
ther by a successful defuse or with an explosion), all the
robots restart their operations as before. Therefore, all the
robots are equal in this approach, since each one pursues
the same work, without any distinction in terms of roles.
2. Dictatorship: This second approach is instead character-
ized by a strong static distinction in terms of roles. In
fact, the entire mission is coordinated by a single robot,
called master, that is responsible for the choice of the sup-
porter robot and the communication among the colony. It
serves a crucial point for the mission, since its failure can-
not be tolerated and would result in the failure of the en-
tire mission. For this reason we tested this approach with
three different values of fault probability for the master:
0%, 15% and 30%. Another important role is held by the
supporters, the robots which are responsible for helping a
robot who finds a mine. When it happens, the finder robot
calls the master, who chooses the nearest supporter be-
tween the two supporters that are available. The last role
is the searcher, that is a robot responsible for finding the
mines scattered in the map.
Scenerio Descriptions
The tests focused on a mission in which robots must dis-
cover mines that are scattered in the maps, and then they
must defuse them. Each bomb has a probability to explode
by accident, and a probability to activate its timer; so the
defuse operation may not be successful. Moreover some en-
emy robots (terrorists), with each one being able to release a
certain number of mines, can also be present. In particular,
four scenarios were developed:
1. 11 robots, no terrorists, with 30 mines placed in the map,
time limit of 5 minutes. We took the following parame-
ters:Dead robots, Defused mines
2. 11 robots, 2 terrorists that the robots can’t kill, 5 mines
placed in the map, time limit of 5 minutes. The following
metrics were evaluated:Dead robots, Defused mines
3. 11 robots, 2 terrorists that the robots can kill, 5 mines
placed in the map. The following metrics were used:
Dead robots, Mission Time, Time for Killing Enemies
4. 11 robots, no terrorists, 25 mines placed in the map. The
metrics include:Dead robots, Mission Time
Environments
To test the scenarios we used 3 different maps, intentionally
developed; in particular they simulate a hangar (see figure
6), a market (see figure 7), and an airport (see figure 8).
Figure 6: The Hangar Environment
Results
In this section, several graphs are presented, the most signif-
icant ones, obtained by testing the various architectures in
the different environments, and reporting either the results
of each try, or the average achieved from a group of experi-
ments made on a certain scenario and in a particular environ-
ment. The graphics illustrated in the next three figures refer
Figure 7: The Market Environment
Figure 8: The Airport Environment
respectively to the number of defused mines in the first sce-
nario with a fault probability for Dictatorship’s master of 0%
(figure 9); the number of robots lost during the mission in the
first scenario with a fault probability of 30% (figure 10); and
the time spent for mission completion in the fourth scenery
with a fault probability of 0% (figure 11), all in the airport
map. In these graphs the numbers on the border indicate the
number of the experimental group (where each group con-
sists of one hundred experiments), while the numbers on the
radii indicate the average value reported for each one. In all
these figures it can be seen that the MP architecture adapts
its behaviors to the dynamic development of the mission,
choosing from time to time the strategy that best adapts to
external conditions, thanks above all to a coalitionregener-
ation method. This allows the robots to confirm a govern-
ing coalition, if mission results are better when compared to
previous governments. In fact it can be seen how the line
representing MP performance always follows the best point
between the opponent architectures, since it chooses the best
mix according to their performances. In particular, in figure
9 the exterior line is the best, since it reports the highest val-
ues in terms of defused mines: in this case it is the anarchy
strategy, but we can see the MP line is tightly close to it,
since the architecture reflects what the best strategy is, and
doesn’t deviate from it often. In figure 10 the best line is
Figure 9: First Scenario : Bombs Defused
Figure 10: First Scenario : Dead Robots
Figure 11: Fourth Scenario : Mission Time
he internal one, because it reports a lower number of dead
robots. We see how opponent architectures alternate their
performance, crossing themselves several times; MP is in-
stead almost always in the middle, since it selecting among
the best one at various times, thus maintaining good perfor-
mance in all the experimental groups. In the end in figure
11, where the furthest internal line indicates lower mission
time, thus better results, MP is very close to the Dictatorship
line, because it obtains the highest performance during the
experiments.
This phenomenon is even better depicted in the following
two pictures, representing the average results, in terms of
defused mines, obtained in the second scenario for the dif-
ferent cases of 0% Dictatorship’s master fault probability
(figure 12) and of 30% Dictatorship’s master fault proba-
bility (figure 13) after the entire set of experiments. Here is
even more evident how the MP architecture is able to choose
the best strategy, because in the first case it selects Dictator-
ship, which has the best performance, but when the master’s
fault probability is increased thus reducing its result quality,
MP robots quickly change the government coalition, mov-
ing their position towards the opposite side, thus maintaining
enhanced performance, while the Dictatorship performance
deteriorates.
Figure 12: Second Scenario with Dictatorship’s Master
Fault Probability of 0%
Figure 13: Second Scenario with Dictatorship’s Master
Fault Probability of 30%
Summary and Conclusions
One of the fundamental and innovative features of the
Metaphor of Politics Architecture is its dynamic social struc-
ture. It provides a good balance between the cost of forming
a coalition and the performance of the coalition itself. It
is also capable of forming superior political coalitions for
difficult problem solving under conditions of limited infor-
mation and resources.
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